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Beyond Misrepresentations: Defining Primary and
Secondary Liability Under Subsections (a) and (c) of
Rule 10b-5
Some curs 'dfraud/ Ofenemy hath beguil 'd thee, yet
unknown, /And me with thee hath ruin d.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Both primary actors, like corporations, and secondary actors,
such as accountants, attorneys, and bankers that service businesses,
can be primarily liable for fraud under Rule lOb-5. The key
determination is whether these actors are primarily or secondarily
liable. Primary liability and aiding and abetting liability are not
unmistakably partitioned concepts, but courts have recently blurred
these grades of liability with respect to claims for employing a
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud and for engaging in acts,
practices, or courses of business that operate as fraud.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's unexpected foreclosure of a
defrauded investor's civil action against secondary actors in
Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver,2 circuit
courts have grappled with distinguishing primary liability from
secondary, or aiding and abetting, liability. Until recently,
plaintiffs brought the bulk of securities fraud actions under Rule
1Ob-5(b), which prohibits the material misrepresentation of facts
relied upon by buyers and sellers of securities. 3 Subsections (a)
and (c), which prohibit fraudulent schemes and actions
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. John Milton, PARADISE LOST 294 (David Hawkes ed., Barnes & Noble
Books 2004) (1674).
2. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994). CentralBank did not clarify whether there was no cause of action for
aiding and abetting at all or whether no private right of action existed. After all,
the Central Bank plaintiffs brought a private action, as opposed to an
enforcement action, which the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
initiates. Congress resolved the issue with Section 104 of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), in which it gave the SEC the
authority to bring enforcement actions against individuals for aiding and
abetting securities fraud. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §
104, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2005). See also Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten
(?) Partnersin Fraud,73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 158 (2004).
3. The SEC reports that misrepresentation claims fell within the top ten
complaints it received from investors in 2004. However, the number of
misrepresentation complaints was down 30.22% from 2003. SEC, Investor
Complaints and Questions, http://www.sec.gov/news/data.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2007).
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respectively, were of little significance.4 Now, defrauded plaintiffs
are making creative arguments via subsections (a) and (c) to
distinguish primary from secondary liability and potentially
circumvent Central Bank's prohibition of private civil actions
against secondary actors.
The Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for securities cases.5
Therefore, since the Court recently ruled on loss causation, it is
unlikely it will reevaluate its 1994 Central Bank decision with
regard to subsections (a) and (c) in the near future. 6 Until then, the
courts, the parties, and the SEC must settle on a workable
definition for primary and secondary liability under subsections (a)
and (c). This challenge is formidable in light of the tripartite split
that exists for representational claims under subsection (b). Part II
of this comment presents the recent legal history of Rule 1Ob-5,
which does not extend beyond conduct encompassed in Section
10(b), 7 and focuses on the circuit splits regarding
misrepresentation claims and the recent judicial uses of subsections
4. The full text of Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, as authorized
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act ("1934 Act"), is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2005).
5. This practice may change with the present changes in the composition
of the Court.
6. The loss causation case referenced is Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (finding investor allegations that pharmaceutical
company's misrepresentation inflated stock price were insufficient to establish
loss causation in fraud claim). Further, on September 27, 2005, the Court
granted certiorari in another securities fraud case, Dabit v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 545
U.S. 1164 (2005) (questioning whether the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") preempts state law class action claims
brought solely by persons induced to hold, as opposed to buy or sell, securities).
On March 21, 2006, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision.
126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (holding that SLUSA preempts state law class action
claims for fraudulent manipulation of stock prices).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651
(1997). Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to prescribe rules "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (2005). The SEC created Rule lob-5 pursuant to this section of the 1934
Act.
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(a) and (c) in non-representational claims. Part III identifies the
problem and describes the underpinnings of fraud liability for
investors, companies, and the government. Part IV proposes that
the SEC is correct by defining primary violators as those who
create fraud with intent.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 provide no insight in defining
primary and secondary liability. The provisions make it unlawful
for any person to directly or indirectly: (1) "employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud"; (2) "make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact"; or (3) "engage in
any act, practice, or course of business" that operates as fraud or
deceit on any person. 8 The text of the provisions does not suggest
a distinction in liability.
The legal background of primary and secondary liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 begins with Central Bank. Before
this Supreme Court decision, lower courts allowed private actions
for aiding and abetting securities fraud. 9 There was no need to
distinguish between primary and secondary liability because both
resulted in private, civil liability. Central Bank complicated fraud
claims because it pronounced that a plain reading of Section 101Sb)
yielded no private cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud.
Before Central Bank, the Supreme Court had also implicitly
allowed aiding and abetting claims. For example, although the
Court in Dirks v. SEC reversed the D.C. Circuit's finding that the
petitioner had aided and abetted an insurance company's fraud, it
did not reverse the circuit court's decision on the basis that a
secondary fraud claim did not exist. Instead, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, found that Dirks "had no duty to abstain
from use of the inside information that he obtained."' 1 The Court
did not question the existence of an aiding and abetting action
under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 until CentralBank.

8.
9.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).

10. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994).
11.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
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A. The Central Bank Decision and the End of PrivateActions
Against Secondary Violators
The facts of Central Bank were mostly uncontested. After a
public building authority defaulted on secured bonds, the bond
purchasers sued several defendants in connection with the bonds'
sale. Most importantly, the buyers sued the bank that was trustee
of the bond issues and alleged that the bank was secondarily liable
under Section 10(b) for aiding and abetting the other defendants'
fraud. 12 Using strict statutory interpretation, the Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's judgment for the buyer and held that no private
action for aiding and abetting another's primary fraud existed
under the statute.' 3 In taking its surprisingly limited view of
secondary liability, the Court stated: "If, as respondents seem to
say, Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we
presume it would have used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the
statutory text. But it did not."' 4 Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 did
not imply a right of action against secondary violators, but neither
the fraud provisions themselves nor the Court defined secondary
liability for misrepresentation claims.
B. Post-Central Bank CircuitSplits and Three Diverse
Approaches to Defining Securities FraudLiability
Central Bank's proscription of secondary liability claims
radically increased the importance of distinguishing primary
violators from secondary violators.
In eliminating private
secondary actions, the Court complicated securities law and made
no mention of what the divide should be between actionable
primary claims and non-actionable secondary claims.i1

12. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 167-68.
13. Id.at 191-92.
14. Id.at 177.
15. Many practitioners decline to welcome further High Court intervention
into this area of securities law, arguing that the Court misses the mark on
technical regulatory issues. This author takes the position that these issues
appear and have been treated as technical because the issue has not been
properly framed before courts, which irregularly hear securities litigation. Fraud
is a long-standing legal concept with manifestations in torts and contracts. See,
e.g., John Eykyn Hovenden, A GENERAL TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES BY WHICH COURTS OF EQUITY ARE GUIDED AS TO THE PREVENTION
OR REMEDIAL CORRECTION OF FRAUD: WITH NUMEROUS INCIDENTAL NOTICES

OF COLLATERAL POINTS, BOTH OF LAW AND EQUITY (1825).

Securities

exchanges themselves may be technically complicated transactions, but fraud is
not.
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The circuit courts have issued divergent opinions on the
meanings of primary and secondary liability. The Second and
Ninth Circuits hear the most securities litigation in the federal
court system but these circuits are on opposite sides of the Section
10(b) liability split. Whereas the Second Circuit adopted the
bright-line test in Shapiro v. Cantor,'6 the Ninth Circuit applied the
substantial participation test. 17 The SEC proposed an intermediate
test, called the creator test, in Klein v. Boyd.'
1. The Bright-Line Test
The majority of circuits adhere to the bright-line test for
secondary liability. 19 This test narrows primary liability for
secondary actors. Secondary actors are primarily liable under
Section 10(b) if they make a misstatement, know or should know
that the misstatement will be communicated to investors, and are
credited with making the misstatement that is publicly
disseminated before investment decisions occur.20 The Tenth
Circuit has found: "The critical element separating primary from
aiding and abetting violations is the existence of a representation,
either by statement or omission, made by the defendant, that is
relied upon by the plaintiff., 2 1 Anything shy of directly or

On a related note, the SEC frequently intervenes as amicus in securities
litigation. The commission directs and instructs courts and Congress regarding
any number of securities issues, i.e., hedge fund advisor registration, standing
and pleading requirements for loss causation, and statutes of limitations under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See SEC, Commission Legal Briefs, available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigationbriefs.shtml. By further example, the Enron
court sided with the SEC's brief regarding the creator test, which this comment
later discusses. See discussion infra Part II.B.3, IV.
16. 123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997).
17. In re Homestore.com, Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 790, 800 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
18. Brief of the SEC, Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir.
1998), available at SEC, Commission Legal Briefs, http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/briefs/klein.txt.
19. Tracy A. Nichols & Stephen P. Warren, Aiding and Abetting Liability
Under Section 10(b), in 38 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 9105 (2005), 2005
WLNR 11427499.
20. Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
21. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Tenth Circuit wavers on the attribution element. See SEC v. Lucent Tech.,
363 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D.N.J. 2005).
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indirectly making a false or misleading statement is 22aiding and
abetting and, as such, is not actionable by private claim.
2. The SubstantialParticipationTest
Under the substantial participation test, primary violators do
not have to make a misstatement; rather, a significant or substantial
role in the misstatement is sufficient to constitute primary
liability. 23 For a defendant to be secondarily liable in a circuit
utilizing the substantial participation test, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) the existence of an independent primary wrong, (2)
actual knowledge or reckless disregard by the alleged aider
and abettor of the wrong and of his or her role in furthering
it, and (3) substantial assistance in the wrong. There is no
requirement in the Ninth Circuit's test that the aider and
abettor commit a manipulative or deceptive act or that the
injured parties even rely24on the substantial assistance given
by the aider and abettor.
3. The Creatoror Intermediate Test
The SEC proposed the creator test for primary liability, a test
subsequently adopted by the Enron court. 25 Under the creator test,
an actor is a primary violator if he creates a misrepresentation and
acts with the necessary intent. 26 As the Enron court noted, "it
would not be necessary for a person to be the initiator of a
misrepresentation in order to be a primary violator., 27 The SEC
provided a few hypotheticals for clarity. For example, provided "a
plaintiff can plead and prove scienter, a person can be a primary
violator if he . . . writes misrepresentations for inclusion in a
document to be given to investors, even if the idea for those
misrepresentations came from someone else.",28 Further, an actor:
22. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (1lth Cir. 2001);
Wright, 152 F.3d 169;Anixter, 77 F.3d 1215.
23. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
24. Id. at 967.
25. Presently, no circuits have adopted the creator test. Its greatest
proponent thus far is the district court in Enron.
26. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
27. Id. (quoting Brief of the SEC, supra note 18). The majority of the
SEC's brief in Enron is substantially the same as its brief in Klein. Id. at 585-

86.

28. Id. at 588 (quoting Brief of the SEC, supra note 18). See also source
cited supra note 26.
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who prepares a truthful and complete portion of a
document would not be liable as a primary violator for
misrepresentations in other portions of the document. Even
assuming such a person knew of misrepresentations
elsewhere in the document and thus had the requisite
. . would not have created those
scienter, he.
misrepresentations. 29
To summarize, the SEC requires a secondary actor to create the
misrepresentation and possess intent to be primarily liable.
Despite the SEC's vague wording, its creator test is a workable
solution to distinguishing primary from secondary liability. In
addition, it applies equally well to representational and nonrepresentational fraud claims. It achieves a workable test for
under Rule 1Ob-5(a), (b), and (c).
liability
Although
the creator distinction is practicable, one great
problem with the test is that it does not specify the type of intent
required. 30 There is a noticeable difference between intent to: (1)
employ any device, scheme, or artifice; make or omit any untrue
statement; and engage in any act, practice, or course; and (2)
defraud. Fortunately, this difference is common to scienter
generally, and scholarship and jurisprudence both provide much
assistance on the subject.
C. The Zandford 3 1 Invitation to Non-MisrepresentationClaims
In SEC v. Zandford, the Court stated that it had never held that
there must be a misrepresentation to violate Rule 1Ob-5 fraud
provisions. 32 This suggestion provided defrauded plaintiffs the
impetus to expand the scope of primary liability beyond
misstatements. However, Zandford did state, and In re Dynegy,
Inc. Securities Litigation later affirmed, that conduct is actionable33
under Section 10(b) only if it coincides with the sale of securities.
The connection of the fraud to the sale of securities was the

29. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (quoting Brief of the SEC, supra
note 18).
30. The PSLRA guidance on intent does not apply. In re Parmalat Sec.
Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
31. SECv. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
32. Id. at 820.
33. In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 916 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (quoting Zandford, 535 U.S. at 821).
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deciding factor in these cases.3 4 Regardless of the exact ruling,
35
many courts are examining subsections (a) and (c) fraud claims.
The broad purpose of Section 10(b) also contributes to courts'
willingness to find liability. This purpose is to prevent corporate
actors from impairing stock market function and disenabling
investors from buying and selling securities at undistorted,
although not necessarily accurate, economic valuations. 36 There
are four recent decisions that each add an ingredient to the mix of
primary and
37 secondary liability with regard to fraudulent acts and
schemes.
38
1. The Homestore.com Decision

In re Homestore.com, Inc. Securities Litigation provides
information on how to define a scheme to defraud and it prompted
an SEC amicus brief addressing "the appropriate test" to find a
defendant primarily, rather than secondarily, liable for a scheme to
defraud.39 In Homestore.com, a pension fund plaintiff brought a
class action against a business, its partners, and its vendors,
alleging that they enhanced its stock price in violation of
subsections (a), (b), and (c). 40 The court declined to expand
liability under Section 10(b) for the business partners. 4 1 However,
the court did find that the complaint sufficiently alleged certain
auditors acted with deliberate recklessness and substantially
participated in the preparation of errant financial reports.42
The plaintiffs alleged that seventeen of Homestore.com's
business partners and third party vendors violated Rule 1Ob-5(a)
through a scheme to make an omission. 43 Before dismissing the
argument as too attenuated to hold outside defendants primarily
34. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813; In reDynegy, 339 F. Supp. 2d 804.
35. See, e.g., In re Parmalat,376 F. Supp. 2d 472; In re Homestore.com,
Inc., Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re Lernout &
Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2003); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
36. In re Parmalat,376 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
37. Id.; In re Homestore.com, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018; In re Lernout, 236 F.
Supp. 2d 161; In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549.
38. InreHomestore.com, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018.
39. Id.; Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Positions That
Favor Appellant, Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., No. 04-55665 (9th Cir. Oct.
21, 2004), available at SEC, Commission Legal Briefs, http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/briefs.shtml.
40. In re Homestore.com, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
41. Id. at 1037-38.
42. Id. at 1042-45.
43. Id.at 1037.
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liable for a scheme to defraud, the court called the plaintiffs'
arguments a "creative and plausible" theory of liability.' In the
end, the court declined to be the first to hold simple business
partners to a fraudulent corporation liable for a scheme to defraud.
The court insisted that, regardless of how the plaintiffs defined
"scheme," Section 10(b) primary violations do not result from
mere participation or facilitation. The court did not mention the
SEC's brief, and there is no indication that the court was inclined
to expressly adopt its "appropriate test."
In its amicus brief, the SEC recommended:
Any person who directly or indirectly engages in a
manipulative or deceptive act as part of a scheme to
defraud can be a primary violator of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5; any person who provides assistance to other
participants in a scheme but does not himself engage in a
manipulative or deceptive act can only be an aider and
abettor.46
Perhaps envisioning judicial reluctance to adopt its single
statement definition of Section 10(b) liability, the SEC offered
some hypotheticals to illustrate its point. The SEC suggested the
following:
[A] bank that makes a loan, even knowing that the
borrower will use the proceeds to commit securities fraud,
is at most an aider and abettor. The bank itself has not
engaged in any manipulative or deceptive act because there
is nothing manipulative or deceptive about the bank's
making of the loan.47
Throughout the course of recent litigation, the SEC has continued
to adjust this test to secondary actors.
48
2. The Lernout & Hauspie Decision

The district court in In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities
Litigation allowed a Rule 1Ob-5 claim against defendants Flanders
Language Valley Fund ("FLV") and Mercator, who allegedly
created sham companies to inflate earnings for the titular language
44. Id. at 1037-38.
45. Id. at 1038.
46. Brief of the SEC, supra note 39, at 16. See also source cited supra note
19.
47. Brief of the SEC, supra note 39, at 20.
48. In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass.
2003).
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recognition software firm, Lernout & Hauspie.
The court
examined allegations that FLV and Mercator set up, funded, and
operated sham companies that inflated Lernout & Hauspie's
earnings by showing bogus revenue from software licensing
agreements while omitting research costs on the firm's financial
statements.49 Lernout & Hauspie added two items to liability
under subsections (a) and (c). The first is the way it framed the
allegations, stating that the fraudulent scheme aimed "to defraud
the securities market."50 The decision recognizes that there is
more at stake in fraud claims than redressing harm to defrauded
investors. The harm extends to the whole market. Lernout &
Hauspie's second contribution is that it provides the language the
In re ParmalatSecurities Litigation51 court used to expand primary
liability under subsections (a) and (c). The Lernout & Hauspie
court held:
[T]he better reading of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is that they
impose primary liability on any person who substantially
participates in a manipulative or deceptive scheme by
directly or indirectly employing a manipulative or
deceptive device (like the creation or financing of a sham
entity) intended to mislead investors, even ifa material
misstatement by anotherperson creates
52 the nexus between
the scheme and the securitiesmarket.
This statement opened the door for the Southern District of New
York to circumvent Central Bank in its Parmalat decision by
ignoring the disconnect between the creation of an ordinary
business plan, which is, at most, aiding and abetting, and the
creation of an otherwise ordinary business plan with the intent to
defraud, which is a primary violation. 53 In other words, the
Parmalatdecision exceeds the bounds of CentralBank because it
confuses the idea that the creator of the scheme does not
necessarily have to be the creator of the nexus between the scheme
and market with the idea that the creator of the scheme does not
have to demonstrate an intent to defraud.

49. Id.at 166-69.
50. Id.at 165.
51. 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
52. In re Lernout & Hauspie, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (emphasis added).
53. 376 F. Supp. 2d 472. See also discussion infra Part II.C.4.
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54

3. The Enron Decision

In In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & ERISA
Litigation, shareholder plaintiffs brought a securities class action
against energy trader Enron and its accountants, attorneys, and
bankers.
Plaintiffs alleged Enron overstated its assets and
understated its debts through regular practices of buying and selling
corporate entities in non-arm's length transactions. 55 This largescale Ponzi scheme 56 likely netted Enron executives over fifty
million dollars. 57 In her discussion of secondary liability under
subsections (a) and (c), Judge Melinda Harmon adopted the creator
test, proposed by the SEC, as an intermediate standard between the
bright-line and substantial participation tests. She found the SEC's
approach "well reasoned and reasonable, balanced in its concern for
protection for victimized investors as well as for meritlessly
harassed defendants (including businesses, law firms, accountants
and underwriters). 58 She also found the creator test "consistent
with the language of § 1Ob(b), Rule 1Ob-5, and CentralBank."59
60

4. The Parmalat Decision

The In re Parmalat Securities Litigation court addressed the
non-representational liability of financial institutions for structuring
transactions that were concealed, or misrepresented, on Parmalat's
financial statements. 61 The decision's analysis of Second Circuit,
post-Central Bank cases shows that there is little consequential
difference between misstatements and fraudulent acts and schemes.
While the court repeatedly insists that its "analysis is not an end run
around CentralBank," its interpretation of the subsection (a) and (c)
claims placed misrepresentation claims that would otherwise be

54. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549
(S.D. Tex. 2002).
55. Id.at 613-14.
56. A Ponzi scheme uses allegedly legitimately earned, but actually
fraudulently earned, funds to perpetuate the scheme. It attracts further
investment by providing artificially inflated returns to original investors. It is
essentially money laundering. See, e.g., United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 951 (2002); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
57. Enron's Many Strands: Excerpts from Testimony Before House
Subcommittee on Enron Collapse,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at C4.
58. In reEnron, 235F. Supp. 2d at 590-91.
59. Id.
60. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
61. Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

disallowed under Central
Bank within the primary liability
62
parameters of (a) and (c).
The Parmalat court looked to SEC v. First Jersey Securities,
Inc.,63 to define the reach of subsections (a) and (c) after Central
Bank.64 In First Jersey, a broker dealer firm promoted only one
security at a time, then encouraged the buyers of this security to sell
back to the firm at a low profit. 65 First Jersey then split these
repurchased funds and sold the components to different customers at
higher prices than it originally charged. 66 The Parnalatcourt found
at least three incidences of fraud: fraud on the original customers at
the time of purchase, fraud on those same customers at the time of
sale, and fraud on the component purchasers. 67 The Parmalatcourt,
invoking the benefit of hindsight, stated that the First Jersey
scenario "might be understood as an example of a scheme in
violation of subsections (a) and (c) of Rule lOb-5." 68 The First
Jersey court characterized the scenario as fraud by omission, but the
Parmalat court's observation is valid because there is little
consequential difference between fraud by misstatement and fraud
by action or scheme.
The creator test levels any potential
differences and uniformly applies to subsections (a), (b), and (c).
The Parmalatcourt largely agreed with the Lernout & Hauspie
court, except that the Second Circuit adheres to the bright-line test,
rather than the substantial participation test. 69 This statement does
little to negate the Parmalat court's expansion of liability in ways
more consistent with the substantial participation test than with the
bright-line test to which it purports to adhere. Further, its "final
point" that its analysis "is not a back door into liability for those
who help others make a false statement or omission in violation of
subsection (b)" is inconsistent with the violations of subsections (a)
and (c) it found.70
The opinion presented three groups of alleged subsections (a)
and (c) violations. 7 1 The first violation related to secondary actors,
mainly Citigroup and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, issuing

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Circuit.
70.
71.

Id.at 509.
101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997).
!n re Parmalat,376 F. Supp. 2d at 499-500.
FirstJersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1457.
Id.
In re Parmalat,376 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
Id.
Id. at 502-03. The Southern District of New York sits in the Second
Id.at 503.
Id.at 504-05.
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securities on and factoring worthless grocery invoices.72 This first
violation is most relevant to this comment because the court denied
the secondary actors' motions to dismiss. 73 The second claimed
violation involved transactions that mischaracterized debt, in
particular, disguising loans as equity investments or assets.74
Citigroup and Bank of America were the most involved secondary
actors in these transactions, and the court decided these allegations
at most amounted to aiding and abetting fraud. 75 The third violation
related almost entirely to Credit Suisse First Boston and concerned
transfers or relinquishments of conversion rights in exchange for the
value of bond issues. 76 The court frankly stated, "[I]t is not entirely
clear from the complaint whether ...the transfer or relinquishment
was part of a deceptive device or contrivance., 77 The second
claimed violation is less relevant to this comment than the first
because the court did not find a primary violation of Rule 1Ob-5, and
the third is least relevant because it is not clear the court understands
the fraud alleged.
The first asserted violation the Parmalat court found expands
primary liability for acts and schemes beyond what the bright-line
test allows for misrepresentations.
Citigroup's securitization
appeared to be a conventional operation. 78 Citigroup would at most
be an aider and abettor under the bright-line test because Parmalat's
omission that the invoices were worthless under its invoicing system
constituted the fraud. Even if Citigroup knew the invoices were
worthless, Parmalat's invoicing system made them worthless and
falsely represented its cash flow. Thus, the omission is attributable
to Parmalat, and Citigroup's transactions on behalf of Parmalat were
valid at face value. Citigroup would fail the bright-line test for
misrepresentations,
but the court entertained the nonrepresentational claims.
III.

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON

FRAUD REGULATION

As if a three-part split over primary and secondary liability
under subsection (b) were not problematic enough, several courts
are taking a long, hard look at defrauded plaintiffs' suggestions that
secondary actors are primarily liable for fraudulent acts and schemes
72. Id. at 481-82,488-89.
73. Id.at 505, 517.
74. Id. at 482, 485-87.
75.

Id. at 517.

76. Id.at 489-90.
77. Id.at 505.
78. Id.at 504.
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to defraud even though these actors cannot be primarily liable for
fraudulent misstatements.7 9 To say this area of the law is confused
is both narrow-sighted and an understatement because of the huge
consequences Rule 1Ob-5 places upon diversely-motivated securities
actors. There are three prominent players in the securities "game":
investors, companies, and government. Above all, investors and
non-fraudulent companies stand to suffer the most from fraud, so it
is with their perspective in mind that the legislators and courts
should craft a test for liability under subsections (a) and (c).
A. The Investor Perspective
Secondary fraud is a risk investors take when they participate in
financial markets. Courts fashioning a division between primary
and secondary liability for fraudulent acts and schemes to defraud
must recognize that investors take this risk. Many even argue that
80
total risk of fraud is one risk that investors must necessarily take.
Even with regulations against fraud in place, all investors assume
some risk of fraud. 81 This risk is systematic, or market, risk rather
than unsystematic, or individualized, risk.82 Regulations, like Rule
lOb-5, Sarbanes-Oxley, 3 and PSLRA,84 do not necessarily control
the market; the free market and its players regulate themselves.
Whistleblower statutes echo this rationale and are an example of the
85
ways legislators recognize the market as primarily self-regulatory.
Artificial adjustments play some role as incentives to market
players, but incentives simply cannot control. There is irony in that
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, 4(2) J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 20 (1990). See also Donald C.
Langevoort, Capping Damagesfor Open-Market Securities Fraud,38 ARIZ. L.
REv. 639, 647-48 (1996), for a discussion of the relationship of risks assumed to
damages awarded.
81. See Ethiopis Tafara, Dir. of the Office of Int'l Affairs, SEC, Speech by
SEC Staff: Annual Conference on Capital Management of the Risk Management
Association and Professional Risk Managers' International Association (Nov. 9,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchll0904et.htm, for a
regulator's perspective on risk generally.
82. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, XIX(3) J. FIN. 425, 429, 436-42 (1964).
But see also Shyam Sunder, Stationarity of Market Risk: Random Coefficients
Tests for IndividualStocks, XXXV(4) J. FiN. 883 (1980).
83. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2005).
84. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1,
77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2005).
85. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLuM. L. REv. 319, 375 (2005).
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fraud operates as market manipulation in much the same way that
regulations are artificial market manipulators.
If some risk of fraud exists regardless of regulation, then
Congress fixes or assigns market risk for fraud through its
regulations. Congress sets this risk level, at least in part, with
Section 10(b), but the courts' ability to interpret the definition of
fraud means the judiciary also plays a large role in setting market
risk for fraud.
The Supreme Court has already spoken on whether investor risk
includes secondary actor fraud.86 When the Court decided that no
private right of action exists against secondary violators of Rule
lOb-5, it adjusted the market risk investors take for fraud in an
upward direction. Again, these secondary fraudulent acts are
included in the risk all investors take. Additionally, Congress has
maintained its refusal to legislatively include secondary liability
among actionable claims for fraud, 87 despite the Court's statement
that it would decline to create a comprehensive aiding and abetting
liability rule without "expression of congressional direction to do
so." 8 8 When Congress failed to legislate contrary to CentralBank
with regard to private civil actions, it rubber-stamped the inclusion
of secondary fraud in market risk.
The legislative branch has continually demonstrated its
preference for inclusion of fraud in investor risk. Congress has
refused to grant private, civil liability for secondary fraudulent acts
by the use of its legislative authority and it has affirmatively
legislated in ways suggesting it agrees that investor risk includes
secondary actor fraud. Two examples of this legislative expression
and acceptance are the Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of
200289 and Section 308 "Fair Funds." 90
Congress has proposed many acts aimed to protect investors.
Some have passed; some have not. Had Congress enacted the
Investor Protection Act of 2002, secondary actors would have been
more susceptible to fraud claims because the Act contained a section
restoring liability for aiding and abetting corporate fraud. 9 1
86. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
173, 177 (1994).
87. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 90, 91.
88. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 183.
89. Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3818, § 14
(2002). This piece of legislation was proposed but never passed. See also
source cited supra note 19.
90. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act), 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2005).
91. Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3818, § 14
(2002).
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Because Congress has legislated in other ways to compensate
defrauded investors, the expansion of civil secondary liability under
Rule 1Ob-5(a), (b), and (c) is problematic. At least theoretically,
investors can receive double compensation for loss, while
companies can pay double penalties. Fair funds are one 92example
where Congress has aimed to pay back defrauded investors.
Recovery from SEC enforcement actions is deposited in so93
called "fair funds" meant to benefit victims of securities violations.
In any SEC judicial or administrative action under securities laws,
the commission obtains civil penalties, which it adds to the
disgorgement monies it has already obtained.9 4 Distribution of
awards from these fair funds is proportionate to claimed losses,
although the SEC emphasizes that disgorgement is not restitution
and requests disgorgement based on a reasonable amount of the
defendants ill-gotten gains. 95 However, investors have actually
received very little from fair funds.9 6 Regardless of the amount an
investor recovers from fair funds, the fraudulent company is subject
to double payment if private, civil liability exists in addition to SEC
enforcement actions.
B. The CorporatePerspective
Following the occurrence of fraud at a corporation, much of the
damage to the fraudulent corporation is done before and by the fraud
itself. Even more damage happens when the SEC makes public
allegations of fraud. Those organizations hurt most by the
occurrence of fraud are the traded companies that see general
decreases in investment activity and negative secondary effects from
a decline in stock price. Individuals and financial practitioners often
overreact to both information and what they believe others will do.
There are cognitive limitations and biases to choices made under

92. Peter M. Saparoff & Breton Leone-Quick, Secondary Actor Liability:
The Next Major Securities Litigation Issue to Be (Re) Considered by the
Supreme Court, availableat SK080 ALI-ABA 881 (2005).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2005).
94. Id.
95. Report Pursuant to Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, at
11, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf
96. Harmed Investors Got Tiny Fractionof SEC FairFunds, WALL ST. J.
ABSTRACTS, Oct. 4, 2005, at D2; Marcy Gordon, Defrauded Investors Have
Gotten Only 1 Percent of Money Collected for Them from the SEC, AP
DATASTREAM, Oct. 3, 2005, at 20:14:58.
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the implications of
risk, and scholars have just begun to consider
97
cognitive biases on securities regulations.
However, most securities regulations today focus on cognitive
form and content of disclosures, leaving investor emotions
unattended. For example, investor anxiety over accounting scandals
or corporate malfeasance may cause investors to "pessimistically
misperceive, or even ignore completely, any sound fundamentals
associated with a particular security during the investment
process." 98 Section 10(b) directs remedial action against the
fraudulent companies for the benefit of defrauded investors. 99 The
pessimistic emotions lingering in non-defrauded or previouslydefrauded investors hurt non-fraudulent companies because they act
as a large, uncertain burden on investor confidence. By contrast,
investor confidence is an amorphous concept, one which may not
lend itself toward regulation. Further, consideration of investor
confidence effects within Section 10(b) secondary liability may not
give those subject to the regulation enough notice to comply with
anti-fraud goals.
Even scholars who argue that the optimal amount of fraud in a
system is not zero, but varies with market conditions, stop short of
including intentional frauds in their analysis. They argue that if
courts really want to protect investments, then the protection
accorded should not turn on whether the knowledgeable party is
completely honest.' 00 Complete honesty can eliminate bargaining,
though not
and society should encourage mutually beneficial,
0'
exchanges.'
accurate,
completely
necessarily
Expansion of secondary actor liability also raises some specific
concerns for parties subject to other securities litigation and
proceedings. SEC enforcement proceedings operate separately from,
private litigation. A trend toward expansion of secondary liability
may mean that secondary actors will have difficulty negotiating a
settlement with the SEC that does not make these actors susceptible
to civil complaints. 10 2 Additionally, statutes of limitations, periods
97.

Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in

Securities Markets, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 502

(Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
98. Id. at 503.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 79j (2005).
100.

Kim Lane Scheppele, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN

THE COMMON LAW 164-66 (1988) (citing Michael Darby & Edi Karny, Free
Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 13 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67-88
(1973)).
101. Id. at 164 (citing Michael Darby & Edi Kamy, Free Competition and
the OptimalAmount ofFraud,13 J.L.& ECoN. 67, 67-88 (1973)).
102. Saparoff & Leone-Quick, supra note 92; see also In re Lernout &
Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (2003).
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of repose, and proper venue can become unnecessarily complicated
issues when those accused of fraud face multiple actions under
statutes and jurisprudence as equally ambiguous as those discussed
in this comment.03
C. The Government Perspective
Government action regarding secondary liability lacks
consistency. Government loyalties are divided between constituent
investors and revenue-producing corporate firms.' 0 4 Some have
suggested that expansion of secondary liability would devastate the
industries that blow the whistle on corporate fraud. Large securities
class actions have the potential to bankrupt the accounting industry,
or at least the "Big Four"'1 5 accounting firms responsible for setting
the standards of business practice compliance with federal
regulations. 10 6
Congressional membership composition and
demographics likely contribute to governmental hesitance to
explicitly expand secondary liability. However, cries for fairness
from defrauded constituents do not always fall on deaf ears and
provide great material for re-election grandstanding.
Considering behavioral economics with the law gives
lawmakers a more comprehensive model to formulate good
legislation but it requires them to ask some difficult questions, such
as how the law will affect human behavior, how individuals are
likely to respond to changes in the law, and why the law takes the
form it does. This series of questions represents a positive approach
to behavioral economics and the law.'0 7 To achieve workable
enforcement and deterrence of securities fraud, lawmakers should
use this approach with respect to primary and secondary actors.
Otherwise, they risk incomplete assessment of transactions and
stand to expend resources on a rule that does not work. As
103. Saparoff & Leone-Quick, supra note 92.
104. Compare Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S. Rep. No. 792,
(April 17, 1934), for an example of the presidential and congressional impulse
toward enacting the 1934 Act, with Hansen Mitchell, Wendy L. Mitchell & Neil
J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity:
Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94(4) AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 891, 899 (2000), for some empirical evidence on political activity by
domestic and foreign corporations.
105. The accounting firms commonly referred to as the "Big Four" are
Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young.
106. Floyd Norris, Britain Refuses to Put Cap on Liability of Big Auditors,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at W1.
107. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 13 BEHAV. L. & ECON. 39
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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discussed earlier with regard to the impetus to expand the scope of
primary liability beyond misstatements, the broad purpose of
Section 10(b) is to adapt to creative forms of fraud.' 0 8 This positive
approach is a general, but adequate, guideline to making laws
responsive to different frauds.
The prescriptive task of the law is to use it to achieve specific
ends, such as deterring undesirable behavior. The task requires
attention to behavioral insights to improve the law's ability to
advance society toward desirable outcomes. 0 9 This statement begs
the question of what outcome society desires, especially in relation
to securities fraud. A main predictor of whether plaintiffs bring
securities fraud actions is whether the company's market value has
changed.11 ° A main predictor is not whether society perceived the
company's behavior as reasonable after the fact."' Investors do not
want to lose money, so the negative consequence should apply
foremost to those who cause the valuation change.
It appears this discussion has come full circle because it is not
clear who causes the price change. Companies can commit
fraudulent acts about which the public will not know. In such a
case, perhaps the one who brings the fraud to light causes the value
change. In actuality, the but-for cause of the price change is the bad
act because, without the bad act, there would be nothing to disclose.
By the same token, false disclosures of fraud that result in price
change can be as damning as fraud itself. Loss causation is a
perplexing topic, but falls outside the scope of this comment, which
instead rests on the idea that the proper end of fraud regulation
favors investor and non-fraudulent corporate perspectives.
In summary, the three players-investors, companies, and
government-enter the primary and secondary liability divide from
different perspectives. Expansion of secondary liability until it
encompasses primary liability, like the substantial participation test,
ignores the risk of secondary fraud the Court and Congress say
investors should bear. But, rigid limitation of primary liability, like
the bright-line test, does not protect investors against fraudulent
changes in security values. Non-fraudulent companies want to
avoid negative effects from volatile investor confidence; and
fraudulent companies want to avoid specialized legal uncertainties
when subject to private class actions in conjunction with SEC
enforcement actions. The government's task is to implement a
balance between primary and secondary liability that enforces and
108. See discussion supra Part II.C.
109. See generally Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 107.
110. Id. at 38, 41-42.
111. Id.
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deters securities fraud. The creator test, though not perfect, best
accommodates all three perspectives because it can protect
investors, help stabilize market confidence, and lessen legal
uncertainties related to fraud by misstatement and scheme or action.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE CREATOR TEST

The SEC is on the verge of a viable solution to the primary and
secondary liability debate, but its creator test is not perfect and
requires further articulation to more aptly apply to subsections (a)
and (c). Though the test itself is broadly and vaguely worded, it has
the potential to embrace solutions to the problems investors and
non-fraudulent companies face. The creator test can meet the task
of defining primary and secondary actors, and thus liability, in a way
the legislature has not. It can fulfill these lofty ends because it
reflects a positive approach to behavioral economics and the law.
The creator test asks the right questions for society to answer.
SEC attorneys originally submitted the creator test brief in Klein
v. Boyd. This case settled while on appeal to the Third Circuit, but
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had initially dismissed the
plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims against a
Philadelphia law firm that had prepared fraudulently incomplete
12
documents provided to plaintiffs by their securities salesman.
Below is the creator test from the SEC's amicus brief in Klein:
The correct standard [for when a person should be primarily
liable], we submit, is that when a person, acting alone or
with others, creates a misrepresentation, the person can be
liable as a primary violator-assuming,
of course, that he or
3
she acts with the requisite scienter.11
The SEC did not argue the facts on the appellants' behalf but it
did state that, assuming the facts alleged in the complaint were true,
the law firm was liable under the creator test as a primary
violator. 114 The law firm created documents that omitted relevant
information that the firm could be charged with knowing. The
creation of these documents, and the allegedly intentional omission
of information, made the law firm a primary violator under the
creator test.
The SEC's creator test is a good approach to defining primary
and secondary liability because it incorporates both actions and

112. Brief of the SEC, supra note 18, at 5-7.
113. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
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intentions, rejects the bright-line test's rigidity, and avoids the
substantial participation test's propensity to expand liability.
First, the intent to defraud requirement complements the creation
of a fraudulent act requirement. Requiring a fraudulent intent
fulfills the notice function needed to affect human behavior. It
conveys that purposeful attempts to defraud result in liability. The
fraudulent intent requirement makes society aware that it disallows
such intent. This awareness is the first step to affecting behavior
against fraud. Also, the intent requirement insulates actors from
accidentally defrauding someone. For example, an accountant who
audits and approves fictitious accounts without knowledge of the
falsehood is not primarily liable for fraud because he did not
approve the fraudulent accounts with scienter.
Likewise, the active creation requirement shapes a human
reaction to fraud that avoids valuation change. As discussed earlier,
investors do not want security values to fall and are less concerned
with the type of action that caused the change. The action
requirement targets prevention of events that lead to price change.
The creator test can anticipate and encourage actions that are
disincentives to fraud.
Material misstatements, fraudulent acts, and schemes to defraud
are often inextricably interwoven. The Parmalatcourt admitted that
the First Jersey scheme looked more like a subsection (a) or (c)
violation. 15 J.P. Morgan's participation in Enron's Ponzi scheme,
at least according to the plaintiffs' allegations, also combined
misstatements with a scheme to defraud. The bank made "loans" to
Enron in a scheme to defraud, then insured against Enron's default
on the loans by purchasing bonds at questionable interest rates and
consistently 6 issuing positive reports on Enron's financial
condition.' 6 It is difficult to tell where the acts end and
misstatements begin, so a single test for acts, schemes, and
misstatements, is advantageous. By defining primary liability as the
intersection of creative action and intent, the creator test applies
equally to all subsections of Rule 1Ob-5.
A second strength of the creator test is that it avoids the most
negative aspects of both the bright-line and substantial participation
tests. The bright-line test has "the unfortunate and unwarranted
consequence of providing a safe harbor from liability to everyone
except those identified with misrepresentations by name."' 17 The
115. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
116. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 696-97 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
117. Brief of the SEC, supra note 18, at 12. See also In re Enron, 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549.
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substantial participation test risks engulfing all secondary liability
into primary liability. The creator test is neither so rigid that it
provides a safe harbor to all except those identified with the fraud,
nor so flexible that the line between primary and secondary liability
is indivisibly blurred.
Yet, the creator test is weak in two main areas. Its first
weakness is that it is less clear than the bright-line test. Further, the
test has little legislative and judicial support.
The most and least attractive feature of the bright-line test to
distinguish primary from secondary liability is its clarity, which
makes it easy both to detect primarily liable actors and to avoid
being detected as a primarily liable actor. Primary liability is
attributable to those who are identified with the misstatement or
fraudulent act or scheme."18 If the party's fraudulent act is not
attached to its identity, that party is secondarily liable." 9 The
bright-line test is a good indicator of liability, so multiple parties
with fraudulent intent can participate in the fraud knowing the only
party subject to private, civil liability is the one identified with the
fraud. 120 The creator test, however, exposes all defendants who
create fraud with the intent to defraud to primary liability.
General antifraud provisions contain no mention of any test
distinguishing primary from secondary liability. The Enron court's
adoption of the creator test is judicial rule-making.' 2 1 Yet, there is
arguably some basis for adopting the creator test over either the
bright-line or substantial participation tests simply because the SEC
was the entity that proposed the creator test. The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC and granted it broad
authority over securities. 22 Thus, the SEC acts with statutory
authority to administer and enforce securities laws. 123 Further,
courts recognize the commission's expertise and request and review
its recommendations.
Agency1constructions of statutes are proper
guidance for courts and litigants. 25
118. Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1998).
119. Id.
120. Brief of the SEC, supra note 18, at 12. See also In re Enron, 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549.
121. In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588, 590 (adopting the SEC's creator

test).

122.

SEC, Laws that Govern the Securities Industry (2005), available at

http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#laws.
123. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l
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While the creator test has garnered some support as an agency
interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, it has little support in
the federal courts. Presently, Judge Harmon's Enron opinion from
the Southern District of Texas is the only decision adopting the
creator test. 12 6 The circuits are mostly settled on whether they apply
the bright-line or substantial participation tests, and these courts may
perceive no need for change.
V. CONCLUSION

Conduct that fails to both create a fraud and be intentional is a
secondary violation of Section 10(b)'s general proscription against
securities fraud. The consequence of meeting this definition is no
private, civil liability for secondary conduct. Defrauded investors
may not recover from these less-than-primarily fraudulent actors,
and the creator test properly indicates the difference between
primary and secondary liability.
Accusations of fraud send investors into panic and corporate
executives into a cold sweat. If courts extend private liability to
secondary actors for fraudulent acts and schemes, corporate
executives will not be the only suits experiencing nervousness.
Attorneys, accountants, and bankers are a few of the others who will
join their company. Without a carefully crafted test to balance the
interests of investors and non-fraudulent companies with those of
corporate service industries, all parties' anxiety levels will continue
to rise. The creator test distinguishes primary from secondary
liability for all types of fraud in a way that directs parties toward
proper conduct and preserves retribution against violators. It is an
appropriate intermediate guide to fraud.
Kimberly Brame

Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); In re Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 588-89 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002)).
125. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998). But see Andrew S. Gold,

Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibittedby Section 10(b) and the Elements
of Rule 10b-5: Reflects on Securities Fraudand Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U.

L. REV. 667, 670-71, 691-700 (2004), for an argument that, following Mead,
Chevron deference should not apply to the SEC's interpretation of Section
10(b).

126. This statement is accurate as of December 2005.
* The author would like to acknowledge Wendell Holmes for his review
of this comment.

